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Introduction 
According to socio-cognitive models in organizational theory literature, managers share 
similar mental models or cognitive maps of the competitiveness of firms in an industry  (Porac et 
al. 1993; Ginsberg,1994, 156; Reger and Huff, 1993). Managers are increasingly challenged to 
understand rapidly changing market settings, where their competitive position is continually 
evolving as competitor initiatives and business dynamics interact complexly.  In well managed 
firms, considerable resources are expended routinely to monitor competitor actions and customer 
requirements.  Over time, this and other information is summarized within the perceptions of 
managers as cognitive maps of the rivalry network in which their firm operates (Porac, et.al., 
1993; Ginsberg 1994). More precisely, as Reger and Huff (1993) comment, that “while cognitive 
simplification and cognitive elaboration could lead to totally idiosyncratic groupings, strategists 
who work in the same industry environment are expected to develop shared perceptions of the 
competitive environment over time” (Reger and Huff, 1993, 106) (emphasis added). Cognitive 
maps are the result of individuals  “organizing, simplifying, and interpret[ing] the mass of 
stimuli that constantly confront them” (Reger and Huff, 1993, 107)
1. According to personal 
construct theory (Kelly, 1955), cognitive maps or constructs are defined “in terms of similarities 
and differences and are organized into systems of meanings which individuals use to develop 
theories about the environment, to make predictions and guide action”(Reger and Huff, 1993, 
107). Although the cognitive map concept has been explored from the manager’s perspective, 
such marketplace perceptions undoubtedly are not limited to the managers in charge of product 
sales in the market.  It seems logical to expect that customers have perceptions of marketplace 
rivalry.  In addition, intermediaries often exist who provide services associated with the product 
in question, whose activities naturally lead to the development of competitiveness perceptions. 
However to date, socio-cognitive models in organizational theory have explored little about the 
differences in cognitive maps outside these management groups. 
                                                           
1Another definition of cognitive maps is they serve “to organize complex issues and phenomena into 
simplified sets of categories and constructs” (Ginsberg, 1994, 156).  
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From a cognitive map context, the organizing and simplification of stimuli that result in 
the perceived idiosyncratic groupings of the competitiveness of firms has strong parallels to 
strategic group theory (Caves and Porter, 1977; Carroll and Swaminathan, 1992; Dranove et al., 
1998 ; Tang and Howard, 1992; Thomas and Venkatraman, 1988). Strategic group theory posits 
that an industry consists of homogeneous clusters of firms whereby each group consists of firms 
that share similar “objective” firm attributes. However, a cognitive approach involves a re-
orientation of this “objective” criterion.  Prior studies of strategic group theory have clustered 
firms based on the “objective” criterion of supply side characteristics, such as “vertical 
integration and diversification and from operational or functional strategies, such as R&D 
expenditure, advertising intensity, and marketing channels”(McGee and Thomas, 149,1986). 
But, since the groupings of firms are based on the subjective interpretations of market 
participants (firms (swine genetic companies), intermediaries (veterinarians) and end consumers 
(farmer)), the criterion at which “strategic groups” are clustered reflects an important cognitive 
component. Hence, a “subjective” or cognitive criterion, as oppose to the “objective” or supply 
side criterion, is advocated
2.  Thus, from a cognitive context, strategic groups do exist because 
cognitive maps are the result of individuals  “organizing, simplifying, and interpret[ing] the mass 
of stimuli that constantly confront them” (Reger and Huff, 1993, 107)
3 in which such 
organization and simplification of mass stimuli in terms of their similarities and differences  
(Kelly, 1955) serve to construct an individual’s perception of how the competitiveness of a 
groups of firms are grouped or clustered.  Therefore, the existence of strategic groups resides in 
social constructionist arguments. Strategic groups exist because they are perceived through the 
cognition of market 
participants.  
                                                           
2This study is not concerned with addressing the current debate at whether “strategic groups exist?” rather 
this study takes as a point of departure that strategic groups do exist from a cognitive perspective. 
3Another definition of cognitive maps is they serve “to organize complex issues and phenomena into 
simplified sets of categories and constructs” (Ginsberg, 1994, 156).  
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Given a cognitive approach to the existence of strategic groups, the purpose of this study 
is the examination of  the existence of differences in cognition between market participants or 
“cognitive dissonance”
4 at a group level of analysis.  More precisely, it involves the study of 
differences in cognitive maps of market participant (firms (swine genetic companies), 
intermediaries (veterinarians) and end consumers (farmer)) in the swine genetic firm value chain 
whereby the cognitive maps of each of these market participant groups refer to the beliefs or 
cognition of the competitiveness of swine genetic firms in the industry (i.e. firms’ 
competitiveness).  Since this study employs a cognitive approach, the notion of “strategic 
groups” is defined as a market participant group’s perception of the competitiveness of firms in 
which firms that are perceived to be similar in certain competitive attributes (i.e. firm size, 
financial strength, price, consumer relations, and quality of products produced, such as sow 
productivity, health status of stock, consistency of product)
5  are clustered together, while those 
that are not grouped with other more similar firms. As a result, the classification of individual 
perceptions of firms based on similarities and differences comprise one’s perceived orientation 
of “strategic groups”. “Strategic groups” are in essence cognitive maps
6.  
                                                           
4For simplicity purpose, the quotation of “cognitive dissonance” refers to cognitive dissonance at the group 
level of analysis, while the absence of quotations, cognitive dissonance, refer to the individual unit of analysis. 
5For a complete listing of firm competitiveness attributes see Table 1. 
6“Strategic groups” in quotations refer to the cognitively defined notion of strategic groups, while the 
absence of quotations refers to the conventional view of strategic groups. 
To achieve this objective of examining differences in cognition or differences in the 
perception of  “strategic groups” between market participants, Cognitive dissonance theory 
(Festinger,1957, 1963; Comegys,1976; Cummings and Venkatesan, 1976; Akerlof and Dickens, 
1982), Strategic Group theory (Caves and Porter, 1977; Carroll and Swaminathan, 1992; 
Dranove et al, 1998 ; Tang and Howard, 1992; Thomas and Venkatraman, 1988)), Information 
Economics (Arrow, 1974) and Structural Hole theory (Burt, 1992) are synthesized such that a  
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model of  “cognitive dissonance” between market participants can be derived. In particular, this 
study defines “cognitive dissonance” as the differences in cognition of the competitiveness of 
firms in the swine genetic industry between groups of market participants (firms (swine genetic 
companies), intermediaries (veterinarians) and end consumers (farmer). The study of “cognitive 
dissonance”, therefore, involves the study of how the perceived strategic groupings of swine 
genetic firms or cognitive maps differ between market participant groups. 
Through the synthesis of these theories, this study’s central argument is reminiscent of 
strategic group theory’s predictions that group membership leads to systematic differences in 
group performance (Caves and Porter, 1977 ; Carroll and Swaminathan, 1992; Dranove et al, 
1998 ; Tang and Howard, 1992; Thomas and Venkatraman, 1988). However, in a cognitive 
context, the central argument of this study is: due to cognitive mobility barriers and group 
interaction effects and tendencies for individuals to strive for cognitive consistency, systematic 
differences in the cognitive perceptions of strategic groups in the swine genetic industry exist. 
This study not only posits as a central tenet that differences in cognition among market 
participants or “cognitive dissonance” exists, but also posits that the degree of  “cognitive 
dissonance” increases between market participant groups as one becomes further removed from 
the cognitive map of the managers (focal group).  
In order to investigate this relation, this paper is divided into four parts. The first part 
provides a review of the psychologist (Festinger, 1957, 1963; Comegys,1976; Cummings and 
Venkatesan, 1976)  and economic interpretation (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982) of the notion of 
cognitive dissonance, in which Strategic Group theory (Caves and Porter, 1977; Carroll and 
Swaminathan, 1992; Dranove et al., 1998 ; Tang and Howard, 1992; Thomas and Venkatraman, 
1988)), Information Economics (Arrow, 1974) and Structural Hole theory (Burt, 1992) are also 
examined such that a synthesis of these theoretical perspectives provides a model of  “cognitive 
dissonance”. The second part briefly discusses cluster analysis techniques and their application 
for studying “cognitive dissonance” at the group level of analysis. The third part involves 
performing cluster analysis on survey data that describes each of the three market participant 
group’s perception of the firms’ competitiveness in the swine genetic industry.  Lastly, the fourth 
part is the discussion of results and conclusions.  
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Literature Review:  
Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
The study of differences in cognition between market participant’s perceived  “strategic 
groups”  relates to the psychologist’s notion of cognitive dissonance. At the individual unit of 
analysis, psychologists have defined cognitive dissonance as “the existence of non-fitting 
relations among cognition” (Festinger, 4,1957; Comegys, 3,1976) in which Festinger defines 
cognitive to mean “any knowledge, opinion, or belief about the environment, about oneself, or 
about one’s behavior”(Comegys, 2,1976). Cognitive dissonance, as stated by Akerlof and 
Dickens (1982) is: “ persons are uncomfortable in maintaining two seemingly contradictory 
ideas” (Akerlof and Dickens, 308,1982).  Hence, cognitive dissonance theory concerns an 
inconsistency in one’s system of beliefs. 
The basic tenet of cognitive dissonance,  (Festinger, 1957; Comegys, 2, 1976; Akerlof 
and Dickens, 1982; Cummings and Venkatesan, 1976) is: individuals are motivated to create 
internal consistencies in one’s belief system. Individuals contain clusters of ideas and have 
tendencies to render such ideas internally consistent or consonant because disconcordant ideas or 
cognitive dissonance creates psychological discomfort (Comegys, 1976) or anxiety (Menasco 
and Hawkins, 1978).  Internally consistent beliefs also include consistency between one’s beliefs 
and one’s actions (Comegys, 1976).  As noted by Comegys (1976), “if a person’s actions are in -
consistent with his beliefs, there is psychological discomfort. Because of this, the person will 
attempt to rationalize the inconsistency and again achieve consistency” (Comegys, 2,1976). 
Hence, the basic tenet of cognitive dissonance theory is a striving for consistency in one’s set of 
internal beliefs and/or consistency between one’s belief and  one’s actions. 
Hence, give the basic tenet of cognitive dissonance that individuals have tendencies to 
reduce dissonance and achieve consonance or consistency (Festinger, 1957, 1963; Comegys, 
1976; Akerlof and Dickens, 1982; Cummings and Venkatesan, 1976) and, subsequently, 
individuals have tendencies to avoid “situations and information which likely increase the 
dissonance”(Comegys, 3,1976).  The hypothesis derived from the first tenet is: the greater the 
“magnitude of dissonance, the greater the pressure to reduce it” (Comegys, 3,1976). In addition,  
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the greater the importance or value to an individual of a belief  (i.e. firms’ competitiveness 
information), the greater pressures there are to resolve inconsistent beliefs or cognitive 
dissonance (Comegys, 1976; Cummings and Venkatesan, 1976). Both suggest that one can 
experience great degrees of cognitive dissonance, but not be motivated to strive for internal 
consistency because the beliefs that are inconsistent have a low value to the individual 
(Comegys, 1976). With respect to the hypothesis derived from the latter tenet, individuals 
exhibiting cognitive dissonance seek information that confirm’s one’s existing belief biases 
one’s preferences and choices of  belief in a manner that perpetuates one’s prior belief  (Akerlof 
and Dickens, 1982). 
Economic Interpretation of Cognitive Dissonance  
In addition to the psychologist conception of cognitive dissonance, an economic 
application of the psychologist’s notion of “cognitive dissonance” is forwarded by Akerlof and 
Dickens (1982). In economist’s terms, cognitive dissonance is represented by three propositions:  
“First, persons not only have preferences over states of the world, but also over their 
beliefs about the state of the world. Second, persons have some control over their beliefs; 
not only are people able to exercise some choice about belief given available information, 
they can also manipulate their own beliefs by selecting sources of information likely to 
conform to “desired” beliefs. Third, ...beliefs once chosen persist over time”(Akerlof and 
Dickens, 307,1982). 
 
These three propositions are intricately related to the latter cognitive dissonance tenet 
that individuals have tendencies to avoid “situations and information which likely increases 
dissonance” (Comegys, 3,1976). This is emphasized in Akerlof and Dickens’ (1982) third 
proposition. Driven by one’s need to strive for internal consistency (Festinger, 1957, 1963; 
Comegys, 1976), the persistent nature of one’s belief perpetuates (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982) 
one’s preferences and choices of beliefs in a fashion that re-affirms one’s prior beliefs  
(Comegys, 1976)
7.  For instance, given that one possesses persistent beliefs about states of the 
world (Proposition 3), such an inherent belief system influences the individual’s preferences of 
what the state of the world is likely to be (Proposition 1). Hence given individual preferences 
over beliefs (Proposition 1), individuals exhibit “choice” through the valuation of the expected 
                                                           
7See Comegys (1976)’s Millerite example.  
  7
benefits and costs among one’s set of beliefs (Proposition 2).  However, due to the preferences of 
beliefs, the choice of a particular belief is inherently biased towards choices that reaffirm’s one’s 
prior beliefs.  Therefore, even with similar information, “experiments show that groups of 
persons with the same information have systematically different beliefs that accord with natural 
theories about their preferences...[in particular]...the cognitive dissonance model not only 
predicts systematic differences in interpretation of given information but also systematic 
differences in receptivity to new information according to preferences”(Akerlof and Dickens, 
309, 1982). As a result, the strive for internal consistency (Festinger, 1957, 1963; Comegys, 
1976) results in a biasing of one’s preferences (Proposition 1) and choices (Proposition 2) in a 
manner that perpetuates prior beliefs (Proposition 3). 
Strategic Group Theory 
Since the theory of cognitive dissonance is confined at the individual unit of analysis, 
Strategic Group theory (Caves and Porter, 1977; Carroll and Swaminathan, 1992; Dranove et al, 
1998; Tang and Howard, 1992; Thomas and Venkatraman, 1988) is applied such that an 
extension of cognitive dissonance theory to a market participant group level of analysis can be 
made.  Therefore, in order to demonstrate the existence of cognitive dissonance, theoretical 
constructs of strategic group theory, in particular notions of group interaction effects (Carroll 
and Swaminathan, 1992; Dranove et al., 1998) and mobility barrier (Caves and Porter, 1977) 
become relevant. Strategic group theory  (Caves and Porter, 1977; Carroll and Swaminathan, 
1992; Dranove et al, 1998; Tang and Howard, 1992; Thomas and Venkatraman, 1988) posits that 
an industry consists of homogenous clusters of groups of firms. Since these firms within a group 
share similar structural features and respond in a similar fashion to outside disturbance and 
exhibit degrees of interdependence, “profit rates may differ systematically among the groups 
making up the industry...”(Caves and Porter, 250,1977). As a result, firm performance is tied to 
group membership. This is termed the strategic group hypothesis. Underlying this prediction is 
the notion of  “mobility barriers”. As an extension to Bain’s concept of “barrier’s to entry” in the 
Industrial Organization literature, Caves and Porter (1977) identified the notion of  “mobility 
barriers” for a strategic group level of analysis. Mobility barriers serve a similar functional role 
as “barriers to entry” , in which it restricts movements of firms from one group to another (Caves  
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and Porter,1977). It is because of these mobility barriers that prevent the equilibration of 
performance differences between strategic groups. As a result, systematic performance 
differences arise from the presence of mobility barriers.  In addition to the performance 
differentiating aspects of mobility barriers, group interaction effects (Carroll and Swaninathan, 
1992; Dranove et al, 1998) also plays such a role. Both Dranove et al. (1998) and Carroll and 
Swaminathan (1992) further develop the strategic group hypothesis by emphasizing the role of 
interdependence or interactions among firms within the group as a source of influence to group 
performance differences. In particular, by measuring group interaction in terms of group size, 
Dranove et al. (1998) emphasizes that the role of collusion increases profitability among groups. 
While Carroll and Swaminathan (1992) who use population size as a proxy for group interaction 
posits legitimacy processes reduces mortality rates. Consequently, given both mobility barriers 
and group interaction effects, systematic performance differences arise between strategic groups. 
Economics of Information and Structural Hole Theory 
In addition to Strategic Group theory, Economics of Information (Arrow, 1974) and 
Structural Hole theory (Burt, 1992) are also important considerations towards explicating 
differences in cognition of strategic groups between market participants. The Economics of 
Information concerns the value of information channels, while Structural Hole theory has 
implications towards the density of information channels. Both of which concern the 
dissemination of beliefs with in and between market participant groups and, thus serves to 
influence the extent of “cognitive dissonance” between such groups.  
Economics of Information: Value of Information Channel 
The value of information channels is based on the benefits and costs of information 
(Arrow, 1974,p38). Information is defined in the context of the perceived relative competitive 
positions (i.e. relative position of a firm i’s attribute to other firms’ attributes) of firms in the 
swine genetic industry. This is termed the information of firms’ competitiveness. In particular, 
the benefits and costs, or net value, of information on firms’ competitiveness differ across 
managerial, veterinarian, and farmer groups such that an uneven formation of information 
channels emerges.  
 Benefits and Costs of Rivalry Network Information  
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In order to support the above argument, one must justify why differences in valuation 
(benefits minus cost) of information on firms’ competitiveness between the three market 
participant groups - managers, veterinarians, and farmers- exist.  This study proposes that the 
valuation of information on firms’ competitiveness is greatest for managers and the least for 
farmers. Veterinarians, the intermediary agents, value such information at a level between 
managers and farmers. That is, the value of  information placed by these groups has the 
following order: 
(Value of firm competitiveness information) Managers > Veterinarians > Farmers 
      Managers place the greatest value on firm competitiveness information because such 
information provides the managers an understanding of their firm’s competitive position vis a vis 
to other firms and, thus, has important implications for strategy formulation. In addition, the 
managers’ information or cognitive perception of its rivalry not only has importance to strategy 
formulation in terms of identifying competitors’ relative strengths and weaknesses, but also such 
cognition or information is a form of human capital that can be a source of potential competitive 
advantage (Ginsberg, 1994). As a result, managers place the highest value on competitiveness 
information because, relative to other market participant groups, such information is most 
pertinent to the performance and survival of the organization. On the other hand, farmers place 
the least value on this information because the competitive position of rival genetic firms is not 
paramount to the successful operation of the farm. Rather, other forms of information that relate 
to farm performance and survivability are of greater importance, i.e swine husbandry practices, 
disease prevention, farm management etc. Veterinarians are intermediary agents whose services 
involve exchange relations to both swine genetic companies and farmers. This exchange relation 
to both parties places a unique informational role on the veterinarian, because the veterinarian 
not only provides services for the farmer, but he/she also plays an informational disseminating 
role, passing technical information on swine genetic companies’ products to farmers. Hence, 
given the veterinary’s intermediary role, their value of firm competitiveness information falls 
between the managers and farmers.  The implication of these different valuations on firms’ 
competitiveness between these market participant groups is it impacts the degree at which each 
group strives for consistency in beliefs.  This group effect stems from the individual’s motivation  
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to reduce cognitive dissonance. From cognitive dissonance theory, the greater the importance or 
value to an individual’s belief, such as the information on firms’ competitiveness , the greater 
pressures there are to resolve inconsistent beliefs or cognitive dissonance (Comegys, 1976; 
Cummings and Venkatesan, 1976) for a given group.  Hence, through the aggregation of 
individual’s striving for consistencies in beliefs, the managerial group has greater motivations, 
due to psychological discomfort, to reduce disconcordant perceptions on the competitiveness’ of 
firms, while the veterinarian group has a moderate level, and lastly farmer groups have the least 
inclination to reduce disconcordant beliefs.  
Structural Hole Theory: Density of Information Channels 
Given the different valuations on the information of firms’ competitiveness in the swine 
genetics industry, the formation of the density of information channels within groups should 
emerge in varying degrees. This view is consistent with the “structural hole” theory of Ronald 
Burt (1992) whereby a network of social relations around a group develop in response to access  
the benefits of information or “structural holes”.  Hence, increasing network relations or, in the 
context of this research, information channels emerge with increasing density as the valuations 
placed on information of firms’ competitiveness increases.  By coupling this “structural hole” 
argument with the value of information channels, one expects that a group who places a high 
value on information will create dense information channels with in its group. Therefore, since 
managers place the greatest value on firms’ competitiveness information, one would, therefore, 
expect the formation of a dense array of informational channels within this group. By employing 
a similar argument for veterinarians, one would expect some “medium” level of density of 
information channels to emerge in this group. Lastly, by employing this argument to farmers, 
this group should have the least dense array of information channels. The implications of the 
varying densities of informational channels
8 with in each market participant group is that the 
greater the densities of informational channels with in the group the greater the degree at which 
information is disseminated. Consequently, the management group should have the greatest 
degree of information flow on firms’ competitiveness and because of this, they are the focal 
                                                           
8Information channels are strictly referred to channels that transmit information about rivalry networks. 
Other forms of information channels also exist across and within groups.   
  11
group to which other groups are compared. Therefore,  relative to the management group, the 
veterinarian group should have moderate information flows of firms’ competitiveness and the 
farmer groups should have the least information flow on firms’ competitiveness. 
Cognitive Dissonance: Strategic Group theory, Information Economics, and Structural 
Hole Theory  
 
Given the concepts from Strategic Group theory, Economics of Information (Arrow, 
1974) and Structural Hole theory (Burt, 1992) a Cognitive Dissonance approach at a market 
participant group level of analysis can now be derived. In synthesizing these theories, one posits 
that group interaction in the form of the density of information channels based on a cognitive 
variant of  “strategic groups”
9 and “cognitive mobility barriers” in the form of high costs of 
communication exchange across market participants gives rise to systematic differences in 
cognition or cognitive dissonance among market participant groups. 
Group Interaction Effects and Structural Hole Theory 
Unlike Carroll and Swaminathan (1992) and Dranove et al (1998) who define group 
interaction in terms of group size and population of a group, respectively, group interaction from 
a cognitive perspective concerns the dissemination of one’s beliefs within a given market 
participant group. As result, the density of interactions, as highlighted by structural hole theory, 
plays the role in disseminating beliefs in a market participant group. These group interactions 
effects involve tendencies for the convergence of individual beliefs. More precisely, since the 
density of information channels influences the extent of the dissemination of beliefs with in a 
group, the greater the density of information channels, the greater the tendency for congruence 
among the beliefs of individuals
10. This argument is consistent with cognitive dissonance theory. 
That is, since the density of information channel positively varies with the value of information, 
then according to cognitive dissonance theory, the greater the value of information the greater 
                                                           
9As oppose to the traditionally defined strategic groups, in the application of strategic group theory to 
cognition, this research defines a “cognitive strategic group” as participants in a group that share similar beliefs of 
particular states of the world. In this case, such beliefs concern the clustering of competitor firms.  
10For instance, “group thinking” or “group myopia” are representations of such convergent tendencies. As 
in the case of manager groups, Porac et al (1993) finds manager’s have tendencies to share similar mental models or 
cognitive maps of their competitive environment.  
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the tendency for individual’s to reduce “non fitting cognition” or reduce cognitive dissonance. 
Through the aggregation of these individual tendencies, the distinct formation of group beliefs 
should, therefore, arise.  Consequently, dense information channels facilitate the convergence of 
beliefs among individuals with in a group.  
More over, not only does this group interaction effect create tendencies for convergence 
of beliefs among individuals in a group, but this effect perpetuates the continued beliefs of 
individual in this group. That is, since group interaction creates a convergence of beliefs, this 
effect serves to perpetuate biases in individual’s preferences and choices such that the group 
interaction effects sustains the maintenance of one’s prior beliefs and subsequently the group’s 
prior beliefs. Therefore, the density of information channels with in a market participant group 
accentuates the group effects by not only creating tendencies for the convergence of individual 
beliefs, but also sustains the persistence of individual beliefs. Through the aggregate of these 
individual tendencies and persistent behaviors, group level convergence and persistence of 
beliefs of firms’ competitiveness should arise. However, since different market participant 
groups reflect varying densities in information channels, due to differences in valuation of 
information on firms’ competitiveness, these group interactions effects will vary across such 
groups. Therefore, similar to the group interaction effects of strategic group theory in generating 
systematic differences in performance across strategic groups, these cognitively based group 
effects yields systematic differences in cognition between market participant groups. In 
particular, due to the higher valuation of information on firms’ competitiveness, the management 
group experiences the greatest group interaction effect or convergence and persistence of beliefs, 
while the veterinarian group experiences a moderate convergence and persistence of beliefs, and 
lastly, the farmer group experiences the least convergence and persistence of beliefs. Such 
differences in convergence and persistence underlie differences in cognition or “cognitive 
dissonance” between such groups.  
Cognitive Mobility Barriers  
In addition to group interaction effects, systematic differences in cognition between 
market participant groups are pervasive due to the high costs associated with the formation of 
between group informational channels. This high cost is reflective of a cognitive based variant of  
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the strategic group notion of “ mobility barriers”, termed “cognitive mobility barriers”. That is, 
due to the high costs associated with the formation of between group formation of informational 
channels, these “cognitive mobility barriers” restrict the intrusion of new beliefs within a  market 
participant group. To motivate this notion, within group formation of information channels are 
“cheaper” than between group formation of information channels because between group 
informational channels involves higher costs associated with uncommon experiences of different 
groups.  Arrow (1974) comments that “information cost increases as it becomes further removed 
from ones own individual information and ability set” whereby the individual is perceived as “a 
bundle of abilities and accumulation of information” (Arrow, 1974, 41). Therefore, in relation to 
this research, the three market participant groups have a greater propensity to open information 
channels within their own groups because “he may find it cheaper to open certain information 
channel rather than others [groups] in ways connected with their ability and knowledge” (Arrow, 
1974, 41). That is, managers, veterinarians and farmer groups have a greater tendency to open 
information channels and thus increase the density of informational channels of that group than 
forming between group information channels, because they incur greater costs of communication 
due to uncommon experiences. Socio-cognitive studies have also found support for such 
phenomenon.  Porac et al (1993) state that “competitive ties within each cognitive group are at 
least twice as dense (sometimes denser) than ties between cognitive groups. Apparently a strong 
bias exists within the industry to focus competitive interactions on similar rather than dissimilar 
firms” (Porac et al., 1993, 35). This suggests that within-group interaction dominates between-
group interaction.  This is consistent with the economics of information channel that the 
formation of information channels is contingent on benefits and costs valuations of information.  
The implication of this high cost of cross-communication (i.e. between groups) or  “cognitive 
mobility barriers” is: since there is a restriction of new beliefs from entering a particular group, 
these “cognitive mobility barriers” serve to perpetuate the existing beliefs within a group. 
Consistent with cognitive dissonance theory, individuals have propensities to reduce dissonance 
by selectively receiving information that is most concurrent with their prior beliefs. 
Consequently, given “cognitive mobility barriers”, this barrier serves at a group level to 
selectively “filter” information - in the form of high costs associated with uncommon  
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experiences- that are most consonant to the group’s existing beliefs. Since this “cognitive 
mobility barrier” serves such a information distilling role, the magnitude of cognitive dissonance 
experienced by an individual within the group is attenuated. That is, the role of  “cognitive 
mobility barriers” in  “filtering” new information from other market participant groups reduces 
the degree of disconcordance or ‘nonfitting relations among cognition” of individuals. This 
results in not only reducing the magnitude of cognitive dissonance among individuals within a 
group and , thus, reduces pressures to strive for internal consistency of beliefs, but also by 
“filtering” information “cognitive mobility barriers” perpetuates these individuals’ preferences 
and choices of beliefs in a fashion that is most congruent to the group’s prior beliefs.  As a result, 
“cognitive mobility barriers”, not only foster the selective reception of information by  manager, 
veterinarian and farmer groups, but also these barriers serve to perpetuate the group’s prior 
beliefs.  Hence, based on these arguments of “cognitive mobility barriers”, one should expect 
sustainable differences in cognition between market participant groups, to thereby give rise to 
“cognitive dissonance” at a strategic group level of analysis. 
As a result, given that group level interaction effects breeds congruence and persistence 
of beliefs among  individuals and  “cognitive mobility barriers” further prevents the entry of new 
beliefs into a group, both theoretical constructs serve to create systematic differences in 
cognition between market participant groups. Consequently, in a cognitive context, group level 
interaction effects and “cognitive mobility barriers” facilitate the convergence and persistence of 
group’s belief such that systematic differences in cognition or cognitive dissonance at a strategic 
group level arises. The sum of these arguments lead to the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1a: Cognitive dissonance or differences in cognition of firms’ competitiveness 
between market participants (firms (swine genetic firms), intermediaries (veterinarians), 
and producers (farmers) exist.   
  
In particular, to account for the relative valuations of information on firms’ competitiveness, a 
subsequent proposition is: 
 
Proposition 1b: The degree of cognitive dissonance or differences in cognition of firms’ 
competitiveness between groups increases as one becomes further removed from the  
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To test propositions 1a and 1b, a survey was conducted with the three market participant 
or respondent groups
11 in the swine industry. The survey required each respondent to name the 
swine genetics firms with which they were familiar. Then, for each of these firms, the respondent 
rated the firm on a ten point scale across 16 attributes. These 16 attributes describe a firm’s 
competitive characteristics of size, financial strength, price, consumer relations, etc and also the 
qualities of the products it produces (i.e. sow productivity, health status of stock, consistency of 
product).  A complete listing of the attributes is shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Product and Firm Characteristics Used for Data Collection 
 
1. Firm Size 
2. Genetic Potential of Animals Sold (sows, boars) for Leanness 
3. Sow Productivity 
4. Herd Health 
5. Ability to Innovate in Bringing Traits to Market 
6. Price 
7. Consistency of Animals Sold 
8. Ability to Meet Market Demand 
9. Financial Soundness of Firm 
10. Quality of Service 
11. Commitment to the Industry 
12. technical Support 
13. Responsiveness to Customers 
14. Promotional Budget 
15. Quality of Personnel 
16. Firm Reputation 
                                                           
11In this methodological section, the terms market participant groups and respondent groups are 
interchangeable. 
The list of attributes was obtained by using the repertory grid technique described by 
Reger (1990). A group of 24 veterinarians that had either specialized swine practices in the 
Midwest or were employees of swine health or swine genetics companies were asked to list the  
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swine genetics firms with which they were familiar.  After this bounded sample of firms was 
elicited, two researchers led the group through the process of eliciting the constructs, or 
attributes, over which rival firm's performance differed. One researcher placed the names of 
three firms on a whiteboard and posed the question, "Which two of these firms are most alike 
and which firm is most different from the other two?" When the group proposed the answer, the 
researcher asked, "Why do you say this?" Open discussion followed and the characteristics that 
defined similarity and difference in the minds of the group was recorded by the second 
researcher. The list of constructs was discussed until consensus was approached and the process 
was repeated with another set of three firms. The triads were repeated until a significant 
proportion of the triads available from the bounded sample was covered. The attributes that were 
used to distinguish among the firm triads were collated and presented back to the group as a list. 
Discussion followed regarding the inclusiveness of the list. Some additional attributes of 
products and the swine genetics companies were added and the group agreed that the final list (1) 
covered the important characteristics of firm structure and behavior and of product performance, 
and (2) was clearly worded so that managers in the swine genetics industry, veterinarians, and 
swine farmers would understand the constructs. 
The survey form was prepared using these 16 constructs, printed, and mailed out to each 
of the participating veterinarians. Each veterinarian completed the survey form for up to eight 
swine genetics firms with which they were familiar. After completing the survey themselves, 
they administered the survey to up to six commercial swine producers from their practice. One 
veterinarian was a member of the top management team of a large swine genetics firm. He 
administered the survey to five other members of his top management team. 
The survey forms were mailed back to the researchers for coding and analysis. The data 
were recorded on a spreadsheet and analyzed with the SPSS statistical package. 
   In the analysis of this data, we assume an individual respondent’s ratings on each of the 
rated firms are independent. That is, the ratings of a given firm are not dependent on the initial 
set of 8 firms identified by the individual respondent. Table 2 shows the number of total surveys 
received, the number of surveys for each respondent group, and the number of different firms 
identified by each respondent.  
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Cluster Analysis Techniques  
Cluster analysis is particularly appropriate to this study because it is a method for 
organizing, simplifying and interpreting large multi variate data sets. That is, the organizing and 
simplifying of large multi variate attributes of the competitiveness’ of firms serves to derive 
cognitive representations of strategic groups for each respondent group.  For each respondent 
group, cluster analysis groups the firms into clusters on the basis of their degree of similarity or 
dissimilarity in attribute ratings. For instance, suppose two respondents within the manager 
group perceive two firms to have highly similar ratings on the 16 attributes.  These firms will be 
clustered within the same group. 
 To elicit the manager respondent group’s cognitive perception, as opposed to the 
individual manager’s perception, the mean values for all 16 attributes of the firms identified by 
all individual respondents in the three groups (managers, vets, farmers) were calculated. 
Specifically, the mean response for each firm’s attribute is the sum of the ratings for each 
attribute divided by the total number of times this firm has been identified by the respondent 
group. This process of calculating a firm’s mean attribute is repeated for all its 16 attributes for 
all firms in this respondent group.  The cluster analysis procedure is then performed on these 
mean values for all firms identified by the respondent group. The resulting clusters of firms 
reflect the respondent group’s cognitive map. In particular, the cluster solution for each 
respondent group reflects the group’s perception of strategic groups in the swine genetics 
industry. Based on these three cognitive maps, the degree of cognitive dissonance can be found  
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by analyzing the differences in cluster solutions across these respondent groups.  
HA Classification Procedure 
In order to conduct cluster analysis on each of the respondent groups, it requires the 
specification of a classification procedure. This classification procedure is the mechanism that 
gives rise to the formation of clusters. A Hierarchal Agglomerative (HA) classification 
procedure is specified and applied to the mean attribute values of each firm for each respondent 
group such that the formation of clusters of firms, based on these mean values, can emerge.  The 
HA procedure is an algorithm that involves progressing “through a series of steps that build a 
tree like structure [dendogram] by either adding individual elements to [i.e. agglomerative] or 
deleting them from [i.e. divisive] clusters.” (Ketchen and Shook, 1996,445). That is, for each 
respondent group, under a HA procedure, each firm is initially classified to its own cluster and 
through a series of agglomeration procedures, each initial (one firm) cluster is added to another 
initial cluster to form a larger cluster. The formation of this larger cluster is based on the degree 
of similarity of the ratings of the attributes of the combining clusters groups [one-firm cluster]. 
The process is repeated until all firms are agglomerated into a single cluster. 
There are 5 common HA algorithms used in cluster analysis research. They are single 
linkage, complete linkage, UPGMA, centroid, and Ward’s method (Ketchen and Shook, 
1996,445)
12. Each of these algorithms yields differing clustering solutions
13 on the same data set 
because each algorithm has its own biases (Ketchen and Shook, 1996, 445). According to 
literature on cluster analysis methods, there is no general consensus on the appropriate algorithm 
to be used  (Ketchen and Shook, 1996). In this research, this issue of choosing the appropriate 
HA algorithm is of lesser importance. Because this study’s objective is to investigate the 
presence and degree of  “cognitive dissonance” -as defined by the existence and magnitude of 
differences in cluster solutions across respondent groups- then the consistent application of one 
                                                           
12For further information on these five HA procedures refer to Romesburg (1990) and Aldenderfer and 
Blashfield (1984). 
 
13 A cluster solution is the result of the cluster analysis whereby each case firm is assigned uniquely to one 
cluster. By definition, cluster membership identifies which firm belongs to which cluster number and the terms 
cluster solution and cluster membership are used interchangeably.  
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HA algorithm is of greater importance than the choice of HA algorithm. However, the 
“appropriate” choice of HA algorithm does lead to more robust cluster solutions. Because the 
performance of HA algorithms are specific to the data set in question (Romesburg, 1990; 
Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984), the use of an “appropriate” HA algorithm for each respondent 
group's data is not a simple decision. Thus, this lack of consistency in HA algorithms will create 
difficulties in testing our propositions of cognitive dissonance across these respondent groups.    
Of the three most reliable cluster algorithms (UPGMA, complete linkage, Ward’s 
method),  the UPGMA method was chosen over others because there is a “greater match 
between the algorithm [UPGMA] selected and the underlying structure of focal data (i.e. sample 
size, distribution of observations, and what types of variables are included -nominal, ordinal, 
ratio or interval) .“ (Ketchen and Shook, 1996). This matching of an appropriate algorithm with 
“focal” data is the general criterion by which the UPGMA algorithm was chosen.   Reger and 
Huff (1993, 109) comment “this method [UPGMA] tends to join clusters with small variances 
and is slightly biased towards producing clusters with the same variance.” This bias towards 
clustering of firm with small variances is consistent with this research’s view. One expects each 
respondent group to share similar cognitive representations of firms’ competitiveness. This is 
particularly relevant for the managerial respondent group because, due to their higher density of 
information channels, the greater exchange of information provides a greater similarity in the 
perception of firms’ competitiveness. Because the manager respondent group has the greatest 
similarity in the perception of firms’ competitiveness, one expects the variance on the firm 
attributes to be small. The management respondent group had the smallest relative standard 
deviation values among the respondent groups (data not shown). 
Resemblance Coefficient 
In addition to the choice of HA algorithm, a similarity index or resemblance coefficient 
needs to be also specified. This resemblance coefficient serves to compare the similarity or 
dissimilarity of firm i’s attributes (i.e. the means of firm i’s attributes) to firm j’s attributes (i.e. 
means of firm j’s attributes) within a respondent group. Although there are many types of 
resemblance coefficients
14, the traditional Euclidean squared distance measure is used here. 
                                                           
14See Romesburg (1990) and Aldenderfer and Blashfield (1984).  
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Similar to the differences in HA algorithms, the diversity of resemblance coefficient measures 
provide different cluster solutions on the same data. The consistent application of one 
resemblance measure to all three respondent types is more pertinent to investigating cognitive 
dissonance than the choice of appropriate resemblance measure. High values for this measure 
denote large statistical distances and therefore reflect high degrees of dissimilarity among cases 
[firms]. Likewise, low values for this measure denote small distance and therefore reflect low 
degrees of dissimilarity [high similarity] among cases.  The Euclidian square distance measure is 
as follows: 
Sxy = Σi(xi - yi)
2 , where 
Xi is the value of the ith attribute for firm (case) X and 
Yi is the value of the ith attribute for firm (case) Y. 
Number of Clusters in the Solution 
A hierarchical agglomerative clustering algorithm shows all possible sets of cluster 
membership between two extremes: all firms are clusters of one and all firms are in a single 
cluster. The specification of the number of clusters involves some degree of subjective 
assessment by the researcher. This is one of the criticisms expressed about cluster analysis. 
Although cluster analysis is a useful tool to organize and simplify large multi attribute objects, 
“the main problem is that cluster analysis’s reliance on researcher judgement makes the validity 
of results subject to serious doubts.” (Ketchen and Shook, 1996, 453). Although this is a major 
concern for cluster research, these subjective issues of specifying the appropriate cluster cut-off 
is, again, of secondary importance to the study of  “cognitive dissonance” in this study. In 
reiterating the previous arguments for the choice of HA algorithm and resemblance coefficient, 
the consistent application of a specified cluster cutoff (number of clusters in cluster solution) 
across each of the respondent groups is necessary to make appropriate comparisons of cluster 
solutions between these groups such that measures of  “cognitive dissonance” can be assessed. 
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Although this study acknowledges the importance of validation issues
15, due to the researcher’s 
subjective assessments, an a priori specification of number of cluster groups or cluster cut-off is 
made. For reasons discussed below, this research specifies a 3- and 4-cluster solution.  
                                                           
15See Ketchen and Shook (1996) and Romesburg (1990) for validation techniques. 
 
To elaborate this discussion of the choice of the appropriate cluster cut off, although one 
can employ factor analysis to determine tendencies in the data that provide general guidelines for 
the appropriate cluster cut-off  (Punj and Stewart, 1983; Hair et al, 1998), this was not pursued. 
Even though, such a procedure would provide greater validation of cluster membership results, 
this procedure is not pursued because the objectives of this study concerns largely the empirical 
explication that there are differences in cognitive maps between respondent groups or “cognitive 
dissonance” at a group level of analysis. Hence, rather than emphasizing the appropriate cluster 
cut off, this study is only concerned with specifying a consistent cluster cuff off value across all 
respondent groups as a means towards identifying the existence of  “cognitive dissonance”. 
However, with respect to proposition 1b, the use of factor analysis may be more relevant. Since 
proposition 1b is concerned with identifying the degree and not the existence of “cognitive 
dissonance” between respondent groups, the specification of cluster cut off values influences the 
magnitude of  “cognitive dissonance”. But such a procedure is problematic because the manager 
respondent group contains only six responses (see table 3) and, therefore, even if one were to 
conduct factor analysis to determine the appropriate cluster cut off values, the small sample of 
the manager respondent group raises the empirical reliability of the result. That is, improving the 
reliability of the cluster solutions through the use of general guidelines (Punj and Stewart, 1983; 
Hair et al, 1998) does not provide empirical support of the cluster solutions, because we are still 
confronted with the limits of the sample size of the manager respondent group. This argument is 
based on the fact that  “cluster analysis depends substantially on the representativeness of the 
data (Hair et al. 1998) in which even if improvements in the reliability of the cluster solutions 
can be afforded by employing factor analysis, the limited size of the manager group is not 
representative of managers perceptions on a whole. Therefore, in spite improvements in terms of  
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reliability of cluster solutions, the resulting solutions cannot (dis) confirm empirical support for 
our propositions. As a result, a 3 and 4 cluster solution is maintained. 
Given a 3 and 4 cluster cut off, in order to obtain a statistical measure of the similarities 
and differences among the three cognitive maps of the respondent groups, a common basis for 
comparison must be developed. In order to examine “cognitive dissonance” between the 3 
respondent groups, one needs to find the “intersection” of firms that are common to all 
respondent groups.  A set of 11 firms out of 88 different firms was identified in this data set that 
was common to all three respondent groups. Not only does this identification of the 
“intersection” of firms enable the appropriate comparisons between these respondent groups, but 
also the identification of this smaller sample of firms offers potential advantages in the 
performance of the cluster algorithm. That is, as Punj and Stewart note, “as a cluster algorithm 
includes more and more observations [number of firms]; its performance tend to deteriorate, 
particularly at high levels of coverage, 90% and more. This effect is probably the result of 
outliers beginning to come in to the solution” (Punj and Stewart, 143, 1976). Hence, by 
employing the reduced number of intersecting firms, one averts the deteriorating performance of 
the cluster algorithm
16. Table 3 shows the number of survey responses for each respondent group 
for the intersection of the 11 firms.  
                                                           
16Although, the Punj and Stewart (1983) further note, “K means procedure [a classification proceedure] has 
shown less decrement in performance as coverage increases than have the hierarchal methods” (Punj and Stewart, 
144, 1983), the intersection of firms between these respondent groups do not constitute a significant level of 
coverage (i.e. 90% of 88 different firms identified) that would deteriorate the performance of our HA classification 
proceedure. 
As a result, since only 11 firms out of 88 different firms were common to all respondent 
groups, a 3- and 4-cluster solution was specified, a priori. With this small number of sample 
firms (11 firms) and coupled with the above arguments on the appropriate cluster cut off, an 
increase in cluster solutions (i.e. 5,6,7... cluster solution) will yield small clusters of firms that 
will not lead to an empirically meaningful cluster solution. 
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Goodman and Kruskal lambda and tau Tests: 
In order to test for differences and magnitudes in cognition between respondent groups, 
comparisons of the cluster solutions across these respondent groups are made with the Goodman 
and Kruskal tests (GK-tests)
17. The Goodman and Kruskal tests are “associational” statistics that 
serve to measure the degree of similarity in group membership.  Traditional associational 
statistics (Yule coefficient, coefficient of contingency, and the Tschuprow coefficient) based on 
the chi-square statistic were not employed because they did not convey the necessary 
information about the relative cluster memberships between the maps of the three respondent 
groups. The Goodman and Kruskal lambda and tau, are based on the calculation of proportional 
reduction in error (PRE)
18. The PRE is a statistic describing the degree of association between 
two categories. That is, given an X category [independent variable] that predicts some Y 
category [dependent] variable, the PRE of the dependent variable Y is defined as follows: 
 
PRE:   λy =   (probability of error in case 1) - (probability of error in case 2) 
                                                           
17For details of the derivation of the Goodman-Kruskal lambda and tau tests refer to Reynolds (1984). 
18See Goodman and Kruskal (1954), and Reynolds (1984) for further reference. 
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(probability of error in case 1) 
where probability of error in case 1 => no information on prediction of y, and  
probability of error in case 2 => given information about X to predict Y 
 
The GK-tests have a range of values between 0 and 1. A GK-test value of 1 denotes that two 
cluster solutions have a perfect overlap or perfect association. That is, if each firm in the cluster 
membership X (i.e. cluster membership of a given respondent group) “corresponds to one and 
only one firm”  in a different cluster membership Y (i.e. cluster membership of a second 
respondent group), then “knowing an X category [a particular cluster group in X] permits 
guessing the Y category [a particular cluster group in Y] exactly “ (Reynolds, 1984, 49).  
Conversely, if each firm in cluster membership X does not correspond to “only and only one” 
firm in cluster membership Y, then “knowing an X category [a particular cluster group in X] 
does not permit guessing the Y category [a particular cluster group in Y]“ at all  (Reynolds, 
1984, 49). In the extreme case of non-overlapping cluster memberships, the GK-test takes a 
value of 0.  
These tests can measure either symmetric or asymmetric tests of association between 
categories of X and Y. The symmetric case is that categories X and Y (two different maps) 
jointly predict each other. The asymmetric case assumes that membership in group X predicts 
membership in group Y. For instance, if one cluster solution X (e.g. the managers' cognitive map 
of swine genetics firm rivalry) is used to explain the degree of association of another cluster 
solution Y (e.g. the farmers' cognitive map of swine genetics firm rivalry), the GK-test statistic 
will test if the cluster membership Y is dependent upon the cluster membership X.  Due to the a 
priori specification of the causal relation of information flow, the asymmetric forms of the 
Goodman-Kruskal measures are of particular interest. We exploit the proposed causal relation of 
information flow on firms’ competitiveness to begin from the management respondent group, 
and flowing through the veterinarian group to the farmer respondent group. This assumption is 
consistent with the concept of the direction of firms’ competitiveness information flow expressed 
in proposition 1b.  However one should note that the GK-test can be used only on a pair of 
different cluster memberships at a time. That is, the cluster memberships of each of the 
respondent groups have to be based on a pair-wise comparison. This pair wise comparison is  
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particularly appropriate because propositions 1a and 1b concerns the examination of the 
existence and degree of  “cognitive dissonance” between these respondent groups. 
The asymmetric tests are based upon the following pairwise relations developed in the 
earlier sections of the paper: 
1)Veterinarians’ information on firms’ competitiveness = F (Managers’ information on firms’ competitiveness) 
2)Farmers’ information on firms’ competitiveness = F (Veterinarian’s information on firms’ competitiveness) 
3)Farmers’ information on firms’ competitiveness = F (Managers’ information on firms’ competitiveness) 
 
Given these assumptions on the causal direction of firms’ competitiveness information 
flow, we focus on the GK-test asymmetry statistic that conveys these causal relations. One 
should further note, these assumptions have to be maintained because one cannot use a Grainger 
causality test (Kinnucan and Forker, 1987) to empirically verify the causal relationship of 
network information flows within a cluster analysis framework.  
The G-K tests measure the degree of association from 0 (none) to 1 (complete). The GK-
test can be converted to reflect the degree of cognitive dissonance between respondent groups. 
This can be achieved by subtracting the value of tau or lambda computed for each pairwise 
relation from 1 as a measurement of the degree of incongruence between the cluster solutions or 
cognitive maps between the respondent groups. Thus, this simple conversion will measure the 
degree of cognitive dissonance among respondent groups.       
 
Results and Discussion 
Cluster Analysis  
The UPGMA algorithm was used to identify both 3- and 4-cluster groups that reflect how 
each of the three respondent groups see how the 11 firms compare to each other. The squared 
Euclidian distance across the sixteen attributes measures the similarity or resemblance among the 
eleven firms. Firms in a cluster are seen to be strategically "close" to other members in the 
cluster, relative to those that are "distant" and are in other clusters. The cluster solutions, based 
on the mean values of firm’s attributes (i.e. firms’ competitiveness information), denote the 
perceived strategic groupings or cognitive map for each respondent group. 
Table 4 shows the 3- and 4-cluster solutions to the UPGMA algorithm for the three 
respondent groups. The results from Table 4 require some elaboration.  In using the veterinarian  
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respondent group and the 3 cluster solution as an example, one observes the veterinarian 
respondent group clusters the swine genetics firms Babcock, Farmer’s Hybrid and GIS into one 
group identified by cluster 1. These firms are in the same cluster because the veterinarians 
perceive these firms to have similar ratings on firm attributes. In addition to cluster 1, the 
veterinarians find Cotswold, DanBred, DeKalb, Premier and Seghers Hybrid also to be similar 
and are grouped into cluster 2. Lastly, the veterinarians find Geneti Pork, Newsham and PIC to 
be similar and are grouped into cluster 3.  This cluster solution represents the cognitive map of 
the veterinarian group. Repeating this process for the other respondent groups, one observes the 
cognitive maps of the farmers and the swine genetics firm managers.  We repeat this procedure 
for the 4-cluster solution, as Table 4 shows. However, in general, the differences between the 3- 
and 4-cluster solutions for each respondent group are marginal. 
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Seghers Hybrid   2  2  2  2  1  1 
 
Goodman-Kruskal Lambda and Tau tests (GK-test): 
Since the GK-test measures the degree of association between each firm of one cluster 
membership with another cluster membership, the GK-test only can be used on a pair of different 
cluster memberships at a time.  Given this pair-wise comparison, the process of testing the 
degree of cognitive dissonance between respondents is as follows: 
1) Cluster membership of Veterinarians vs. Farmers 
2) Cluster membership of Farmers vs. Managers 
3) Cluster membership of Managers vs. Veterinarians 
 
The GK lambda and tau statistics for the 3- and 4-cluster solutions are derived. Since this 
research is interested in the existence and degree of cognitive dissonance between respondent 
groups, the GK-test values are converted to show the existence and degree of cognitive 
dissonance by subtracting the test statistic from 1. These "converted" GK-test values are shown 
in Tables 5 and 6. 
According to the results of the GK-tests in Tables 5 and 6, proposition 1a is partially 
supported. Proposition 1a states that the “cognitive dissonance” or differences in cognition of the 
strategic groups between respondent groups exists. Looking at the first row of both tables, we 
see that there are significant differences in the cognitive maps perceived by veterinarians and 
farmers in both cases, when we use the symmetric lambda statistic. This statistic says that these 
two maps do not predict each others' memberships in the computed clusters. In the case of the 4-
cluster solution, the same result exists for pairwise comparison of managers and farmers and of 
managers and veterinarians. That is, there are significant differences in these pairs of maps.  As a 
result, at a 3 cluster solution, we find partial support for the existence of cognitive dissonance 
between the veterinarian and farmer respondent groups, but not for the pairwise comparisons 
between the manager and veterinarian respondent groups and the manager and farmer respondent 
groups.  
With respect to the 4 cluster solution, there is stronger support for the existence of  
“cognitive dissonance” between these 3 respondent groups. However, in spite of this stronger  
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support, these results can only be interpreted as partial support for the existence of “cognitive  
 
Table 5: Converted GK Lambda and Tau statistics for a 3-cluster solution 
 




















Lambda  [dependent] 
 
0.333* 









































1) Null Hypothesis is cluster memberships are independent or perfectly un associated 
2)* denotes significance at 5% 
3)** denotes significance at 10% 
4)When employing the asymmetric GK-tests, the dependent variable in question is found under the value of the test statistic.   
 
Table 6: Converted GK Lambda and Tau statistics for a 4-cluster solution 
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0.333* 









































1) Null Hypothesis is cluster memberships are independent or perfectly un associated 
2)* denotes significance at 5% 
3)** denotes significance at 10% 





dissonance”. The reason is, since cluster analysis depends substantially on the representativeness 
of the data (Hair et al, 1998), the small sample of the manager respondent group limits our 
conclusion that cognitive dissonance exists for the pairwise comparisons between the manager 
and veterinarian respondent groups and the manager and farmer respondent groups. 
Nevertheless, the GK-tests for the pairwise comparisons between the veterinarian and farmer 
respondent groups for both the 3 and 4 cluster solutions provide an empirically more reliable 
support for the existence of  “cognitive dissonance”. The reason being, unlike the small sample 
of the managerial respondent group, both the sample sizes for the veterinarian (21 survey 
responses) and, especially, the farmer respondent groups (105 survey responses)
19 provide a 
significant representativeness of the data at which cluster analysis depends upon. Therefore, one 
concludes from the GK tests that, at the least, there is empirical support for the existence of 
cognitive dissonance between the farmer and veterinarian respondent groups at both the 3 and 4 
cluster solution, while only tentative support for cognitive dissonance for the pairwise 
comparisons between managers and veterinarians respondent groups and managers and farmer 
respondent groups. 
According to the logic in proposition 1b, that states, the degree of  “cognitive 
dissonance” or differences in cognition of firms’ competitiveness in the swine genetic industry 
increases as one becomes further removed from the cognitive map of the manager group or focal 
group. We test that (1) the managers' map does not predict well the veterinarians' map, (2) the 
veterinarians' map does not predict well the farmers' map, and the transitive result (3) that the 
managers' map does not predict the farmers' map. We use the asymmetric GK-lambda and the 
asymmetric G-K tau statistics to test this hypothesis. For the 3-cluster solution, the only 
hypothesis which is accepted is the second: there is cognitive dissonance between the 
veterinarian and the farmer respondent groups. This is shown in the third and fifth cells of the 
first column , where the small values of 1-λ and  1-τ , 0.250 and 0.237 respectively, are 
significant at the 5% probability level. 
                                                           
19See table 4.  
  30
For the 4-cluster solution, there is more evidence that “cognitive dissonance” exists in the 
asymmetric tests. Based on the G-K lambda statistic, the veterinarians’ cognitive  map does not 
predict the farmers' map (1-λ = 0.200) at the 5% confidence level and the managers' cognitive 
map does not predict the veterinarians' cognitive map (1-λ = 0.666) at the 10% confidence level. 
The transitive result holds as well at the 10% confidence level in column 2: (1-λ = 0.600). For 
the G-K tau statistic, the only significant level of  “cognitive dissonance” (1-τ = .238) exists in 
the one-way test that the veterinarians' cognitive map does not predict the farmers' cognitive 
map. 
 One possible explanation for the above results is that the economic roles of the manager, 
veterinarian and farmer respondent groups and, in particular, the economic relationships between 
these respondent groups maybe structured in a manner that does not lead to "additive" cognitive 
dissonance between the swine genetics firms and the end users, the swine farmers. That is, both 
groups have imperfect agreement between their 4-cluster cognitive maps, as measured by the 
symmetric lambda test, but that the informational "distance" between the managers and the 
farmers is not significantly "greater" than the "distance" between the managers and the 
veterinarians. As a result, the information perceptions are distorted about equally, though not 
uniformly significantly, between the managers and the end users and the managers and the 
information agents, the veterinarians. Because we get strongly differing maps between the 
veterinarians and the farmers in all tests, it appears that the biggest gap in the overall information 
network occurs between these two sub-networks. In sum, both the vets and the farmers have an 
incomplete understanding of the competitiveness of firms perceived by the managers, but their 
perceptual differences are greatly different.  
Hence, the GK-tests do not provide support for proposition 1b. More so than in 
proposition 1a where only differences in cognition are emphasized, the determinants of the 
magnitude of  “cognitive dissonance” between these respondent groups is particularly 
confounded by the small sample of the managerial respondent group. That is, since proposition 
1b concerns the magnitude of cognitive dissonance and not its existence (proposition 1a), the 
representativeness of the managerial sample becomes important for cluster analysis to determine 
the validity of the degree of  “cognitive dissonance” between these respondent groups. As a  
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result, the GK-test pairwise comparisons between the manager and veterinarian respondent 
groups and manager and farmer respondent groups cannot, in spite of their statistical 
significance, be interpreted as reflective of the degree of  “cognitive dissonance” between these 
pairwise respondent groups. Consequently, due to the small sample of the managerial respondent 
group, we do not find conclusive support for proposition 1b. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the lack of empirical support for the above result, one may 
tentatively interpret this finding that swine genetic companies may not be effectively using 
veterinarians to disseminate information of the firms' attributes, in particular, attributes  
pertaining to swine genetic products that farmers consume. This has obvious implications on a 
firm’s marketing strategy because this tentative result could imply that normative conclusions an 
increase in information dissemination will influence end user (farmers) behavior to purchase the 
swine genetic firm’s products. However, this conclusion should be tempered when considered in 
the context of this study’s cognitive dissonance framework. As noted by Akerlof and Dickens 
(1982), individual beliefs are persistent in which these persistent beliefs are further exacerbated 
by “cognitive mobility barriers” and group interaction effects. That is, both such mechanisms 
bias individual preferences and choices of individual’s conception of the competitiveness of 
swine genetic firms in a fashion that perpetuates beliefs that are consistent with one’s natural 
theories. In addition, both “cognitive mobility barriers” and group interaction effects not only 
perpetuate these prior beliefs, but also they reduce the magnitude of  “cognitive dissonance” 
among individuals within a group such that there is less striving for cognitive consistency. 
Cummings and Venkatesan (1976) note that the magnitude of cognitive dissonance does not 
have any effect on information seeking behavior, but does have a substantial effect on attitude 
change (i.e. post purchase consumption behavior). But since, cognitive mobility barriers and 
group interaction effects temper the magnitude of cognitive dissonance, it is unlikely that 
information disseminating and/ or attitudinal influencing marketing strategies would be 
effective. 
 Conclusions 
Previous socio-cognitive research in organizational theory literature has found that 
managers share similar mental models or cognitive maps of attributes of the competitiveness of  
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firms in an industry (Porac et al. 1993, Ginsberg, 1994). This paper has provided additional 
insight to this area of literature by studying the cognitive maps of groups outside a given 
industry's management cognition. We have investigated the phenomenon of differences in 
cognition between groups in an industry from the standpoint of theories in Cognitive 
Dissonance, Strategic Groups, Information Economics, and Structural Hole theory, by exploring 
the degree of   “cognitive dissonance” between managers' (focal group), veterinarians' 
(informational agents), and farmers' (consumer group) perceptions of the competitive positions 
of swine genetic firms.  In investigating this phenomena, the central argument forwarded by this 
study is: due to “cognitive mobility barriers” and group interaction effects and tendencies for 
individuals to strive for cognitive consistency, systematic differences in the cognitive 
perceptions of strategic groups in the swine genetic industry exists. From this central argument, 
proposition 1a finds that “cognitive dissonance” between respondent groups’ perceptions of the 
clustering of the competitiveness of firms in the swine genetic exists. The GK-test statistics 
provide support for the existence of  “cognitive dissonance” between the farmer and veterinarian 
respondent groups for both the 3 and 4 cluster solutions. With respect to cognitive dissonance for 
the pairwise comparisons between the manager and farmer respondent groups and manager and 
veterinarian respondent groups, “cognitive dissonance” was present at the 4 cluster solution. 
However, due to limits on the sample size of the managerial respondent group, these latter 
pairwise comparisons only provide tentative support for the existence of cognitive dissonance 
between these groups.  
A corollary to proposition 1a, proposition 1b posits that the degree of  “cognitive 
dissonance” or degree of differences in cognition of firms’ competitiveness in the swine genetic 
industry increases between  groups as one becomes further removed from the cognitive maps of 
the managers (focal group). The results from this empirical application did not find conclusive 
support for this proposition. While partial support for dissonance existed between the cognitive 
maps of the three respondent groups, the degree of dissonance was not significantly greater 
between farmers and industry managers than between veterinarians and industry managers. 
Given this tentative result, the implication of the above result is that the quality of 
information about the products and firm characteristics of genetics firms held by swine  
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veterinarians is not better than the quality of information about swine genetics firms held by 
farmers. Thus, a model of marketing strategy that exploits swine veterinary practitioners as an 
information conduit between genetics firms and end consumers -- farmers -- would be flawed. 
The veterinarians do not have the necessary inter-group information channels in place to act as a 
resource for their clients in making choices about genetics. The empirical results above are borne 
out in discussions with the sample group of specialist veterinarians; they admit to frustration 
about their lack of knowledge of the firms and products in the swine genetics industry beyond 
one or two firms.  
In addition to the lack of intergroup information channels, cognitive mobility barriers and 
group interaction effects may also prohibit changes in the belief or cognition of the 
competitiveness of swine genetic firms by the farmers (end users). Therefore even, if inter-group 
information channels were constructed to support veterinarian’s information disseminating 
efforts, the “cognitive mobility barriers” and group interaction effects prohibits or tempers the 
information disseminating effectiveness of the veterinarian respondent group. Hence, attempts to 
change farmers consumption behavior of swine genetic firm’s products becomes confounded not 
only with information disseminating difficulties, but also obstacles to changes in individual 
behavior due to “cognitive mobility barriers” and group interaction effects. 
This was an exploratory study into the development of the logic of cognitive mapping 
beyond within-firm analysis or within the "dominant logic" of horizontally-related industry 
rivals. By comparing the cognitive map of firm competitiveness held by managers in the focal 
industry, swine genetics, against those maps perceived by decision-makers that operate 
downstream in the value chain from providers of genetics, we can test the usefulness of the 
cognitive map in making strategy to reach end users. This type of comparison has not been done 
previously in the literature and represents a unique extension of the technique. 
Certainly, there should be further research that exploits a larger data set, especially with a 
larger sample of managers from different swine genetics firms. This would provide greater 
empirical support for the pairwise comparison between the manager and veterinarian respondent 
groups and manager and farmer respondent groups. As well, a more comprehensive sample 
could (1) control for regional differences that may exist in the genetics market and (2) expand  
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the set of firms that appear in all three separate cognitive maps. The former would permit the 
analysis of the competitive positions of firms that operate locally or within a single state. The 
latter would permit a more comprehensive map with perhaps more clusters that engender 
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